When Did the Nazi Party Gain Control of Germany Again

Nonfiction

Joseph Goebbels speaks at a Nazi rally.

Credit... Corbis, via Getty Images

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THE DEATH OF DEMOCRACY
Hitler's Rise to Power and the Downfall of the Weimar Republic
By Benjamin Carter Hett
Illustrated. 280 pp. Henry Holt & Company. $xxx.

We ask about the rise of the Nazis from what nosotros think is a great distance. We take for granted that the Germans of the 1930s were quite different from ourselves, and that our consideration of their errors will simply confirm our superiority. The opposite is the case. Although Benjamin Carter Hett makes no comparisons between Germany then and the Usa at present in "The Death of Democracy," his extremely fine study of the end of constitutional dominion in Germany, he dissolves those comforting assumptions. He is not discussing a state of war in which Germans were enemies or describing atrocities that nosotros are sure we could never commit. He presents Hitler's ascension as an element of the collapse of a republic confronting dilemmas of globalization with imperfect instruments and flawed leaders. With conscientious prose and fine scholarship, with fine thumbnail sketches of individuals and concise discussions of institutions and economics, he brings these events shut to us.

The Nazis, in Hett'south account, were above all "a nationalist protestation movement against globalization." Even before the Neat Depression brought huge unemployment to Germany, the caprice of the global economy offered an opportunity to politicians who had simple answers. In their 1920 program, the Nazis proclaimed that "members of foreign nations (noncitizens) are to be expelled from Germany." Side by side would come autarky: Germans would conquer the territory they needed to be self-sufficient, and so create their own economic system in isolation from that of the rest of the world. As Goebbels put it, "We want to build a wall, a protective wall." Hitler maintained that the vicissitudes of globalization were not the outcome of economic forces but of a Jewish international conspiracy.

Hett, a professor of history at Hunter Higher and the Graduate Eye of the City University of New York, sensitively describes a moral crisis that preceded a moral ending. If Jews were held responsible for what happened in Federal republic of germany, then Germans were victims and their actions always defensive. Political irresponsibility flowed from the unfortunate example of President Paul von Hindenburg. He was famous as the victor in a battle on the Eastern Front of World War I, even though the credit was non fully deserved. Hindenburg could not confront the reality of defeat on the Western Front in 1918, and and so spread the lie that the German Army had been "stabbed in the back" by Jews and Socialists. This moral weakness of ane man radiated outward. Once Hindenburg won the presidential elections of 1925, Deutschland was trapped by his oversensitivity nearly a reputation that would not withstand scrutiny. He believed that only he could salve Germany, simply would not put himself forward to do and so, for fear of damaging his epitome. Without Hindenburg's founding fiction and odd posturing, it is unlikely that Hitler would have come up to power.

Every bit Hett capably shows, the Nazis were the great artists of victimhood fiction. Hitler, who had served with High german Jews in the war, spread the thought that Jews had been the enemy within, proposing that the German Army would have won had some of them been gassed to death. Goebbels had Nazi tempest troopers attack leftists precisely so that he could claim that the Nazis were victims of Communist violence. Hitler believed in telling lies and then big that their very calibration left some residuum of credibility. The Nazi plan foresaw that newspapers would serve the "full general expert" rather than reporting, and promised "legal warfare" against opponents who spread information they did not like. They opposed what they called "the organization" by rejecting its basis in the factual world. Germans were not rational individuals with interests, the reasoning went, simply members of a tribe that wanted to follow a leader (Führer).

Much of this was familiar from Italian Fascism, just Hitler's attempt to imitate Mussolini's March on Rome failed. When Hitler tried a insurrection d'état in 1923, he and the Nazis were easily defeated and he was sentenced to prison, where he wrote "Mein Kampf." In Hett'due south business relationship, the electoral rise of the Nazis in the belatedly 1920s and early 1930s had less to exercise with his particular ideas and more than to do with an opening on the political spectrum. The Nazis filled a void between the Catholic electorate of the Centre Party and a working grade that voted Socialist or Communist. Their core constituents, Hett indicates, were Protestants from the countryside or small towns who felt themselves to be the victims of globalization.

Did the Nazis come to power through democratic elections? In Germany in the 1930s, as elsewhere, elections continued even as their meaning changed. The fact that the Nazis used violence to intimidate others meant that elections were not gratis in the normal sense. And the system was rigged in their favor by men in power who had no apply for republic or for democrats. The Nazis were by no ways the handmaidens of German industry or the High german war machine but, as Hett argues, both businessmen and officers formed lobbies in the tardily 1920s that aimed to break the republic and its bastion, the Social Democrats. They tended to confuse their detail interests in lower wages and college military spending with those of the German nation as a whole. This fabricated it easy to see the Social Democrats as foreign and hostile.

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Credit... Associated Printing

In a similarly titled book, "How Democracies Dice," the political scientists Daniel Ziblatt and Steven Levitsky have recently argued that the killers of democracy begin past using the police force against itself. Constitutions break when ill-motivated leaders deliberately expose their vulnerabilities. Certainly this was the case in Germany in 1930. President Hindenburg was technically inside his rights to dissolve the Reichstag, name a new chancellor and rule by decree. Past turning what was meant to exist an exceptional state of affairs into the rule, however, he transformed the German government into a feuding clique disconnected from society. Governments dependent upon the president had no reason to remember creatively about policy, despite the Great Depression. Voters flowed to both extremes, to the Communists and fifty-fifty more to the Nazis. The Nazis took reward of an opportunity created past people who could destroy a republic while lacking the imagination to see what comes adjacent.

When elections were called in 1932, the purpose was not to confirm democracy but to bring down the republic. Hindenburg and his advisers saw the Nazis as a group capable of creating a majority for the right. The elections were a "solution" to a false crisis that had been, as Hett puts it, "manufactured past a political correct wing that wanted to exclude more one-half the population from political representation and refused even the mildest compromise." It did not occur to the president'south army camp that the Nazis would do too every bit they did, or that their leader would escape their control. And and then the feckless schemes of the conservatives realized the violent dreams of the Nazis. The Nazis won 37 pct of the vote in July, 33 percent in a November election, and Hitler became chancellor in January 1933. A few weeks later on, he used the pretext of the arson of the Reichstag to pass an enabling act that in effect replaced the constitution.

Hindenburg died in 1934 believing that he had saved Frg and his own reputation. In fact, he had created the atmospheric condition for the cracking horror of modern times. Hett's volume is implicitly addressed to conservatives. Rather than asking how the left could have acted to finish Hitler, he closes his book by considering the German conservatives who aided Hitler's rise, then inverse their minds and plotted against him. Following the contempo work of Rainer Orth, Hett says that the Night of the Long Knives, the blood purge of June 1934, was directed mainly against these right-fly opponents.

The conclusions for conservatives of today sally clearly: Do not break the rules that hold a republic together, because 1 twenty-four hour period yous will need order. And do not destroy the opponents who respect those rules, because one twenty-four hours you volition miss them.

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Source: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/14/books/review/benjamin-carter-hett-death-of-democracy.html

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